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By Wesley K. Clark
Friday, September 8, 2000; Page A33
The debate over military readiness is starting to address the real issues. First there were the charges that two Army combat divisions weren't ready. Then it was explained that this was an administrative quirk: These divisions weren't "ready" because they were actually doing important military work on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Then everyone seemed to be saying that we have the finest military in the world. As the former U.S. and NATO commander in Europe for the past three years, I certainly agree.
Now we're hearing concerns about what the military should be doing and how it will fare in the future. The charge seems to be that the administration is running down the armed forces by deploying them too often. And so the issue seems to be this: How should the armed forces be used? What is it that we should be ready for? And this in turn, is going to be a debate about U.S. leadership in an ever-changing world.
It's high time we had this debate and settled the issue.
We need continuing American leadership, and we need to provide the resources the armed forces and our other institutions need for the task. And if we're going to lead, we have to deal with problems abroad while they're small and manageable, not wait until major war is required. But for this we need a bipartisan consensus.
After the Cold War, we drew down our military forces by over a third. As a nation we took the opportunity to realize a peace dividend and balance the budget.
For some the end of the Cold War has meant that most of America's armed forces should return home and prepare for the next conflict. Then, if America's survival is at risk, or if there is clear aggression against our allies and we are obligated to respond, our forces will deploy and strike.
For others, success in the Cold War has meant that America's forces are now available to help deal with other problems abroad. They believe the armed forces exist not just to fight America's wars but also to serve American interests in other ways.
The fact is that since the end of the Cold War there have been many problems abroad affecting U.S. interests, and U.S. military forces have addressed them without engaging in major regional conflict--in Bosnia, Kosovo, Korea, Iraq, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor and other places.
For the military, this required having the capability to dominate the full spectrum of military operations, from peacekeeping in the Sinai to war fighting on a major scale. It has required occupying, patrolling, supporting, sustaining and securing, as well as striking and destroying. And it's been more expensive and more demanding to help out abroad than just to stay at home, downsizing the force and preparing for future all-out war.
So the real issue is about national purpose and strategy, not about readiness.
Five years ago most military leaders thought we had bridged the gap between these two distinctive views on the use of our armed forces when we created a strategy of being ready for two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Congress and the public seemed to agree that we had to be able to respond to aggression against our allies in the Far East and the Persian Gulf. And we believed that if we retained capabilities sufficient for these responses, we would be able to take action elsewhere if need be.
But the issue wasn't bridged. In my former position as supreme allied commander in Europe, I could see the anxious concern of European leaders as they watched our continuing and often highly partisan internal debate on issues such as Bosnia, NATO enlargement and Kosovo. The struggle sowed confusion and vacillation abroad. And our military watched also as our budget and supplemental appropriations were often held hostage to the larger issues. We adjusted training, postponed facility repairs and fretted about managing an uncertain budget.
In the military, we held off some needed restructuring to meet emerging commitments, in part because many military leaders sensed a lack of national consensus on the larger issues of purpose and strategy. (Some in the military railed privately against excessive commitments, but the truth was that only a small portion of the force was actually committed.) We never made the kinds of adjustments in forces, equipment, training and sustainment needed to meet the new requirements most efficiently. We emphasized readiness, but we retained an administrative readiness reporting system little changed from the Cold War period, augmented by some measurements of our requirements in case of major regional conflict.
Among leaders in Europe and Africa, where I served, and among ordinary people, too, there is continued respect for American values and influence. For the most part, they seek the same security, opportunities and rights that we enjoy. They would like our friendship and respect. Sometimes, they ask our assistance, especially when their problems affect us too. And occasionally, they seek American leadership. But today they want to know where we stand and where we're headed.
More than 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we owe that to them. And we also owe it to the men and women of the armed forces. They've been the pawns in this debate too long.
We need a bipartisan consensus on America's role and strategy in the world. Then we need to direct that the armed forces be structured, equipped and trained for the missions expected. This means moving farther way from the Cold War force structures. It means lighter weight, more mobile forces and increased investment in high technology. It also means more efficient, streamlined training. And it probably means some additional funding and personnel.
This is, in part, about money. In an economy ripe with budget surplus, let's not impose a false parsimony on those men and women who have volunteered to put their lives on the line for us. We should provide the resources the armed forces need to do their job and provide service members and their families with a standard of living that reflects the wealth of this nation. We can afford it.
It is also about leadership. Don't think America can lead and influence events around the world if it doesn't pull its weight in the difficult work of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and participation in other international institutions. Leadership is not just about reacting to aggression once it occurs--it's about preventing it where we can, helping others in need and supporting those who share our values. This requires generosity of spirit and a willingness to take risks. I believe America has the character and courage for these requirements of leadership.
The writer, a retired Army general, was supreme allied commander in Europe.
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